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INTRODUCTION 
 
The critical philosophy of psychological jurisprudence (“PJ”) is one way to 
undertake an examination of law and policy.1  PJ takes the view that any useful 
assessment of public policy necessarily begins with theory that can “describe, 
explain, and predict law by reference to human behavior.”2  Such a theory offers 
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 1.  See BRUCE A. ARRIGO ET AL., THE ETHICS OF  TOTAL CONFINEMENT: A CRITIQUE OF MADNESS, 
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5–7 (2011) [hereinafter ETHICS] (describing psychological 
jurisprudence generally and its relevance for advancing citizenship); Bruce A. Arrigo, 
De/reconstructing Critical Psychological Jurisprudence: Strategies of Resistance and Struggles for Justice, 6 
INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 363 (2010) [hereinafter Psychological Jurisprudence] (developing the critical 
reformist philosophy of psychological jurisprudence). As socio-cultural criticism and as philosophy 
of law, Arrigo has described the relevance and utility of PJ – especially with respect to case and 
statutory analysis. As he explained:  
“Its [i.e., PJ’s] premise is that the exercise of power is not so much an effect of the law as it 
is a cause, especially since this power is embedded within and conveyed through the very 
construction of legal language and as sourced within legal texts . . . PJ’s critical paradigm 
assumes that the possibility of achieving citizen justice and communal good requires a 
careful (re)reading of the concealed values, unspoken interests and hidden assumptions 
[i.e., underlying ideology] lodged within various legal documents, including those texts 
affecting vulnerable and marginalized individuals and/or collectives.”  
Id. at 364 (internal citations omitted).   
 2.  Mark. A Small, Advancing Psychological Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 11 (1993); see also 
Brian G. Sellers & Bruce A. Arrigo, Adolescent Transfer, Developmental Maturity, and Adjudicative 
Competence: An Ethical And Justice Policy Inquiry, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 435, 436 (2009) 
[hereinafter Adolescent Transfer] (explaining psychological jurisprudence); Heather Y. Bersot & Bruce 
A. Arrigo, The Ethics of Mechanical Restraints in Prisons and Jails: A Preliminary Inquiry from Psychological 
Jurisprudence, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 232 (2011); S. Lorén Trull & Bruce A. Arrigo, U.S. 
Immigration Policy and the 21st Century Conundrum of ‘Child Saving’: A Human Rights, Law and Social 
Science, Political Economic and Philosophical Inquiry, 66 STUD. LAW POL. & SOC’Y 1, 31 (forthcoming 
2015) [hereinafter Juvenile Immigration Policy] (describing the methodology of psychological 
jurisprudence).  
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a critique about how and for whom justice is administered through judicial 
and/or legislative decision-making. It also diagnoses the type of ethic that this 
rendition of justice both dignifies and affirms at structural, institutional, and 
individual levels of inquiry and analysis.3 In practice, PJ offers a path to 
courtroom and congressional fact-finding that guides legislative and judicial 
officials to judgments based on sensible values and pertinent data that support 
human capital (growth in moral character) and wellbeing (depth in moral 
conscience).4  When this virtue-based reasoning informs judicial and legislative 
choice and action, then “these values and data emphasize not merely what law 
[and policy] [are] but what [they] ought to be.”5 
This article examines the North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know (WRK) 
Act through the lens of PJ’s underlying normative philosophy.6  The North 
Carolina State Legislature’s reevaluation of abortion laws is consistent with a 
nationwide shift in abortion policies.7 This move is based in part on a 
 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo, Responding to Crime: Psychological Jurisprudence, Normative 
Philosophy, and Trans-desistance Theory, 41 CRIM. JUST. & BEH. (forthcoming 2015) (outlining the 
elements of PJ’s philosophical critique of justice and diagnosis of ethics in relation to theorizing 
criminal desistance).  
 4.  ETHICS, supra note 1, at 141-159 (discussing how to make the social theory and how to 
translate the critical philosophy of PJ into justice policy).  
 5.  Id. at 6−7. Several empirically-based studies of case and/or statutory law help to 
substantiate this claim. See Adolescent Transfer, supra note 2, at 363 (reviewing the ethics that informs 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s policy prescription on juvenile waiver, cognitive impairment, and 
adjudicative competence); Heather Y. Bersot & Bruce A. Arrigo, Inmate Mental Health, Solitary 
Confinement, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment: An Ethical and Justice Policy Perspective, 2  J. THEOR. & 
PHILOS. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2010) (reviewing the ethics that informs appellate and U.S. Supreme Court 
policy prescription on solitary confinement, mentally disordered offenders, and cruel and unusual 
punishment); Juvenile Immigration Policy, supra note 2, at 34  (reviewing the ethics that informs the 
Nation’s policy prescription on juvenile immigration, criminalization, and human rights); Heather Y. 
Bersot & Bruce A. Arrigo, Responding to Sex Offenders: Empirical Findings, Judicial Decision Making, and 
Legal Moralism, 41 CRIM. JUST. & BEH. (forthcoming 2015) (reviewing the ethics that informs the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s policy prescription on sex offenders, civil commitment, offender registration and 
community notification). Each of these studies considered how (and for whom) justice was 
administered given that the jurisprudential or doctrinal reasoning was not derived from or based 
upon virtue ethics.  
 6.  Our concern is with how political and cultural dynamics coalesce in legislation, revealing a 
fundamental logic whose rhetorical power (i.e., performativity) can itself be the object of inquiry. See, 
e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HESSERL’S THEORY OF SIGNS 
3–16 (David B. Allison trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1973) (1967) (explaining the relationship 
between language and truth); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 74–95 (Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997) (1967) [hereinafter GRAMMATOLOGY] (examining the 
connections between writing and knowledge);  JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 4–5 (Alan Bass trans., 
Continuum 2nd ed. 2002) (1972) [hereinafter POSITIONS] (discussing the relationship between rhetoric 
and meaning). In this regard, the question of investigating any policy prescription can be stated 
thusly: “How and for whom justice is served (or denied) by prevailing…decisions and practices.” 
Bruce A. Arrigo, Justice and the Deconstruction of Psychological Jurisprudence: The Case of Competency to 
Stand Trial, 7 THEOR. CRIMINOL. 55, 55 (2003) [hereinafter Justice and Deconstruction].  
 7.  See, e.g., Ryan Bakelaar, The North Carolina Woman's Right to Know Act: An Unconstitutional 
Infringement on a Physician’s First Amendment Right to Free Speech, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 187, 188–89 
(2013); Ellen Camburn, Doctor-Patient-State Relationship: The Problem with Informed Consent and State 
Mandated Ultrasounds Prior to Abortions, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 304–05 (2013) [hereinafter 
Mandated Ultrasounds]; Aimee Furdyna, Undermining Patient Autonomy by Regulating Informed Consent 
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reevaluation of controversial social science issues surrounding abortion.8 In the 
case of North Carolina’s WRK Act, this shift in political and cultural reality 
challenges socio-legal scholars to reconsider how critical analysis can help to 
account for the process of legislative decision-making, and explain the nature (i.e. 
the character or personality) of ideological policy prescription.9 
To analyze the North Carolina WRK Act, we address three issues. In part I, 
we discuss the country’s shifting jurisprudential climate on abortion law and 
policy. This includes a brief review of the precedential U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that have shaped subsequent lower court decision-making on the 
matter, as well as a summary appraisal of several recent constitutional challenges 
to state abortion statutes. In part II, we describe the key theoretical and 
methodological elements of our PJ-informed investigation of North Carolina’s 
WRK Act. In particular, these elements both explain and integrate feminist 
standpoint epistemology and postmodern deconstructionist philosophy, and 
 
for Abortion, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 638, 639–43 (2013) [hereinafter Informed Consent]; Brendan Pons, The 
Law and Philosophy of Personhood: Where Should South Dakota Abortion Law Go from Here? 58 S.D. L. REV. 
119 (2013) [hereinafter Personhood]; Jeffrey Roseberry, Undue Burden and the Law of Abortion in Arizona, 
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391 (2012) [hereinafter Undue Burden]. On June 17, 2011 the North Carolina WRK Act 
was ratified and presented to Governor Beverly Perdue. Ten days later, Governor Perdue vetoed the 
act, asserting that the bill “contains provisions that are the most extreme in the nation in terms of 
interfering with that [physician/patient] relationship.” Paul Stam, Woman’s Right to Know Act: A 
Legislative History, 28 ISSUES L. & MED.  3, 13 (2012). Governor Perdue additionally argued that the 
relationship and medical advice shared between a physician and his or her patient should not be 
interfered with by elected officials in order to “impose their own ideological agenda on others.” Id. 
Notwithstanding Governor Perdue’s veto, the Woman’s Right to Know Act was passed on July 26, 
2011. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, ch. 90, 2011 N.C. Laws 405.    
 8.  Three prominent streams of inquiry exist within the medical, social and behavioral sciences 
literature regarding a woman’s reproductive rights, the abortion experience, and the health and 
welfare policy that pertains to them. These streams of inquiry include studies that: (1) examine the 
unsettled relationship between mental health and abortion; (2) assert or assess the importance of state 
mandated information on informed consent; and (3) discuss the problem of personal and social 
stigma. See RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1–3 (2013) 
(examining relationship between mental health and abortion, informed consent, and personal and 
social stigma); accord Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health: Evaluating the Evidence, 64 AM. 
PSYCH. 863, 863–63 (2009); Alison Norris, Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes, 
and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 49, 49–50 (2011); Gilda Sedgh et al., Induced Abortion: 
Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 2008, 379 LANCET 625 (2012).  
 9.  We are mindful that multiple, competing, and contradictory notions of ideology exist. See 
generally VALERIE KERRUISH, JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY (1991) (distinguishing between neutral and 
negative ideologies); JOHN THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN 
THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION (1990) (arguing socio-political thinkers have failed to take account 
of culture and mass communication in modern societies). Our view is consistent with Mannheim’s 
Marxian-derived attempt to understand the construct within the confines of the sociology of 
knowledge. See KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 2-3 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1954) (1936). This perspective on and about ideology allows 
the researcher to identify the objective bases through which ideology generates “totalizing” meaning 
and the interpretive bases on which this objectivity makes evident “the social and activist roots of 
thinking.” Id. at 4. Totalizing meaning leads to the problem of reification. This is the condition in 
which dominant belief systems (i.e., ideologies), as socially constructed, function as “facts of nature, 
[the] result of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will.” PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 33 (Anchor 
Books 1967) (1966). As we subsequently explain in our theory and method section, this view of 
ideology can be investigated by relying on and assimilating feminist standpoint epistemology and 
postmodern deconstructionist philosophy.   
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specify how such a synthetic approach to statutory analysis can be deployed to 
evaluate the WRK Act. In part III, we present and discuss the intra-textual 
themes that reflect congressional intent (e.g., attitudes, dispositions, preferences), 
as well as commentary on how these themes reveal (i.e. make present and 
absent) the political and cultural dynamics of abortion policy in North Carolina 
(i.e. legislative ideology). 
 
I. LAW AND POLICY 
 
The country’s climate of shifting jurisprudence on abortion law and policy 
can be traced to several U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including Roe v. Wade,10 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 and Gonzales v. 
Carhart.12  In this section, we summarily explain the essential doctrinal reasoning 
of these rulings and examine several recent appellate and district court cases 
addressing various constitutional challenges to abortion laws. These recent cases 
reveal the divergent (and thus inconsistent) legal reasoning that presently 
underscores (and confounds) the status of abortion law and policy in the United 
States. 
 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
 
In Roe, the Court set forth the trimester framework, limiting states’ abilities 
to restrict women’s access to abortion. Women had the right to choose to have an 
abortion at any time during the first trimester. During the second trimester, 
states could regulate abortion only as reasonably related to promoting the states’ 
interest in maternal health. It was not until the third trimester that the states had 
the right to enact legislation favoring the potential life of a fetus. In the third 
trimester, states could regulate and even proscribe abortion, provided that any 
such regulation included exceptions for situations in which the mother’s life 
would be at risk. 
Roe’s trimester framework remained intact until 1992, when the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.13 This case represented the first challenge to the informed consent 
provisions of Roe. Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute at issue required a 
twenty-four hour waiting period and mandatory counseling for women of all 
ages, ordered that minors receive consent from their parents, and mandated that 
married women notify their husbands before an elective abortion could take 
place. The Casey Court only found the spousal notification provision 
unconstitutional and upheld the other requirements. Additionally, the Casey 
Court affirmed the essential holding of Roe; namely, that a woman’s right to have 
an abortion pre-viability (in the first two trimesters) without undue state 
interference was constitutionally protected. 
 
 10.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 11.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 12.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 13.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (explaining that “the line should be drawn at viability, so that 
before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy”). 
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However, the Casey Court rejected certain personal liberty guarantees that 
were established under Roe’s trimester framework. In particular, Casey allowed 
states to impose restrictions on first trimester abortions so long as those 
restrictions solely served to safeguard a woman’s health interests. Moreover, the 
Court acknowledged that with medical advances, the point of viability might 
occur before the third trimester.  Finally, the Casey Court concluded that any 
state regulation that had the effect of placing a “substantial obstacle” in the way 
of women’s access to pre-viability abortion constituted an “undue burden,” and 
was thus an unconstitutional interference on a woman’s right to choose.14 This 
aspect of the Casey decision set the stage for legal exegeses at the appellate and 
district court levels wherein challenges to the constitutionality of abortion state 
statutes were reviewed under the new undue burden test. 
In the case of Gonzales v. Carhart,15 the lower courts reasoned that the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was unconstitutional because it did not 
include an exception for circumstances in which the banned intact dilation and 
extraction procedure would preserve the health of the woman. Thus, consistent 
with Casey, the lower courts found that the federal ban imposed an undue 
burden on women because the procedure covered pre- and post-viability 
abortion. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, reasoning 
that the ban did not impose an undue burden on women; instead, it prohibited 
only one type of late-term abortion procedure (namely, intact dilation and 
extraction), leaving the more common regular dilation and extraction procedure. 
Since alternatives to the banned method existed, the lack of a health exception 
did not constitute a substantial burden on women’s access to abortion. The 
Carhart decision was the first to deviate from the doctrinal reasoning 
acknowledging that a health exception for women represented sufficient 
constitutional grounds for an abortion to be considered legal. 
 
B. District and Court of Appeals Cases 
 
Several district and appellate court decisions from recent years inform the 
current climate of shifting jurisprudence with respect to abortion law and policy 
around the country. These lower court rulings are the result of First and 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state abortion laws. In what follows, we 
discuss only those cases that are the most recent and germane to determining the 
status of abortion law and policy at the district and appellate court levels. With 
respect to First Amendment challenges, Stuart v. Huff and Texas Medical Providers 
Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey are the most relevant cases for furthering the 
constitutional landscape of abortion law and policy.16 
In Stuart, a group of North Carolina physicians challenged a section of the 
North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know (WRK) Act as unconstitutional under 
First Amendment. They argued that the “speech- and-display” provision of the 
Act, which required physicians to perform an ultrasound and verbally describe 
the image in detail to a woman seeking an abortion, unconstitutionally 
 
 14.  Id. at 877. 
 15.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 143-44 (2007). 
 16.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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compelled physician speech.17 Relying on a strict scrutiny standard of review, the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held that the speech-
and-display requirement was unconstitutional. Under the strict scrutiny 
standard, the state must possess a “compelling government interest and. . . [must 
have] narrowly tailored [the law] to serve that interest.”18 The Stuart Court found 
that North Carolina did not have a state interest sufficient to compel physician 
speech; thus, the speech-and-display provision violated First Amendment free 
speech protections.19 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision, and permanently enjoined the speech-and-
display portion of the North Carolina WRK Act.20 
Similarly, in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services, v. Lakey, a 
speech-and-display requirement in a similar Texas statute, Texas House Bill 15, 
was challenged under the First Amendment’s freedom of speech provision.21 The 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas examined the speech-and-
display provision based on the strict scrutiny standard of review and ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff with respect to the compelled physician speech provision. 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later vacated the District 
Court’s decision. Rather than assessing the statute’s constitutionality under the 
strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court of Appeals applied the “undue 
burden” test and found that “the [statute’s] required disclosures of a sonogram, 
fetal heartbeat and their medical descriptions [constituted] the epitome of 
truthful and non-misleading information.”22As such, the speech-and-display 
requirement did not amount to a substantial obstacle on a woman’s access to 
abortion and was therefore not an undue burden pursuant to the Casey 
framework.23 
In addition to the First Amendment challenges that have surfaced within 
abortion law and policy, several pertinent Fourteenth Amendment concerns have 
 
 17.  Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d. 424, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2011). 
 18.  Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment's 
Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2378 (2013). 
 19.  Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 437.  
 20.  Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013).  
 21.  Lakey, 667 F.3d at 574. 
 22.  Id. at 577-78.   
 23.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (explaining 
that states are allowed to restrict abortions after viability). In a legal analysis of the Texas legislation 
which compels women to receive and view a pre-abortion ultrasound, Camburn reasoned that the 
statute did violate the First Amendment, and that it placed an undue burden on women. See 
Mandated Ultrasounds, supra note 7, at 316–19. The author noted that mandatory ultrasounds and the 
required disclosure of information by physicians surrounding the same, not only informed a woman 
“about the life of a fetus, but more specifically about the life of her fetus.” Id. at 317-18 (emphasis 
added). Additionally, Camburn explained that as more states enact legislation requiring pre-abortion 
ultrasounds, more constitutional challenges will emerge. Id. at  337–38, especially if higher courts fail 
to provide structured guidance about how to best interpret these First Amendment challenges.  The 
author concluded by raising concerns about the mounting partisan nature of the physician-patient 
relationship on matters of women, health, and abortion. Id.. As Camburn observed, “the average 
woman knows what an ultrasound looks like and knows if she views her ultrasound it will look 
roughly the same. These statutes ignore the autonomy of the patient and physician to engage in a 
relationship that is medically appropriate and without political ideology.” Id. at 338. 
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also been raised24 with respect to substantive due process and equal protection. 
In Planned Parenthood Arizona v. American Association of Pro-life Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,25 Planned Parenthood argued that certain provisions of Arizona’s 
abortion legislation – specifically, the informed consent provision – violated the 
equal protection and due process clauses of Arizona’s constitution. The informed 
consent provision indicates that state-mandated information, including an 
ultrasound and adoption options, must be provided to women “orally and in 
person.”26 Following a trial court hearing in which the statute’s provision was 
analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard of review, the court issued a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the informed consent statutory provision 
against which Fourteenth Amendment due process challenges had been raised.  
However, relying on the undue burden standard of review, the Court of Appeals 
of Arizona reversed the trial court’s ruling in part, holding that while receiving 
such information before a mandatory waiting period may be an inconvenience 
for women seeking an abortion, it did  not constitute an undue burden.27 
In Hope Clinic for Women v. Flores,28 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed 
First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the Illinois Parental Notification 
Act of 1995.29 Employing a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court held that 
the Act did not violate the state’s constitutional guarantees to due process, 
privacy, and equality. Rather, the Court determined that the Act was carefully 
crafted to effectuate the goal of promoting minors’ best interests through 
parental consultation prior to abortion.30 
Additionally, several appellate court cases have challenged state abortion 
statutes by relying only on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for jurisprudential or doctrinal guidance. For example, in Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott, Planned Parenthood 
challenged two state statute provisions: one requiring physicians to have active 
admitting privileges to hospitals within 30 miles of an abortion clinic, and 
another that limited the use of medically-induced abortion procedures.31  With 
 
 24.  See Undue Burden, supra note 6 at 392-97 (exploring constitutional challenges relevant to 
Arizona abortion law); see also Jessica L. Knopp, The Unconstitutionality of Ohio’s House Bill 125: The 
Heartbeat Bill as Analyzed Under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 4 AKRON J. 
CONST’L L. & POL’Y 1, 4-6 (2013) (discussing First and Fourteenth Amendment concerns in relation to 
Ohio’s abortion statute).  
 25.  Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &Gynecologists, 257 
P.3d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).  
 26.  Id. at 187. 
 27.  Id. at 191. 
 28.  Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745 (Ill. 2013). 
 29.  The Parental Notification Act of 1995 prohibited physicians from “performing an abortion 
upon an unemancipated minor or ‘incompetent person’” without giving 48 hours of “actual notice” 
to an adult family member, as defined in the Act. The Act allowed for exceptions when the minor or 
incompetent person is accompanied by a person entitled to notice, notice is waived by an entitled 
person, a physician certifies that a medical emergency exists creating insufficient time for notice, 
notice is judicially waived, or  the minor declares herself “a victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or 
physical abuse by an adult family member as defined in” the Act in writing and the attending 
physician certifies receipt of the minor’s written declaration.  Id at 750. 
 30.  See id. at 763 (stating that parental consultation may be necessary to ensure a minor is 
“sufficiently mature and well-informed” to decide whether to have an abortion). 
 31.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 
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respect to hospital admitting privileges, the plaintiffs reasoned that the thirty-
mile radius was too small in a state as large as Texas, and that this provision thus 
imposed an undue burden on women. Further, the plaintiffs argued that 
imposing these limited admitting privileges on physicians could severely 
diminish women’s geographical access to state-sanctioned abortions. With 
respect to limiting the use of medically induced abortion procedures, the 
plaintiffs reasoned that the provision restricted and reduced access to abortion 
for women in the state of Texas. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
enjoined the provision of the statute requiring physicians to have active hospital-
admitting privileges and issued a stay for the provision regarding medically-
induced abortions. The stay meant that physicians would need to positively 
determine that the mother’s life or health necessitated a medically-induced 
procedure before performing one. However, the court indicated that the 
provision should stand in non-life-threatening situations. 
In MKB Management Corporation v. Burdick,32 MKB Management Corp. (the 
only clinic providing abortions in the state of North Dakota) challenged the 
constitutionality of North Dakota House Bill 1456. This bill banned abortions 
following the detection of a fetal heartbeat – as early as six weeks after 
conception – and imposed a criminal charge on physicians performing the 
procedure after that time. MKB argued that the fetal-heartbeat legislation would 
undermine North Dakota’s current abortion statute, which permitted abortions 
until the point of viability. As of this writing, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of North Dakota has granted a preliminary injunction and temporarily 
enjoined the enforcement of House Bill 1456 pending a future decision. 
Similarly, Isaacson v. Horne33 involved an Arizona law that prohibited 
abortions after the 20-week gestation period; that is, after 20 weeks measured 
from the first day of a woman’s last menstrual period. The plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of the ban on the grounds that it would effectively prohibit 
some pre-viability abortions, contrary to the principles enumerated in Roe. 
Following the case’s dismissal at the district court level, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 20-week abortion ban in Arizona 
was unconstitutional. 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was questioned in Horne v. Isaacson,34 
in which the complainant argued that the Ninth Circuit should have analyzed 
the Arizona legislation according to the undue burden test promulgated in Casey. 
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Horne’s petition for a writ of certiorari in 
January of 2014. The petition’s denial is an example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
choice not to render a potential landmark decision on abortion law, leaving 
lower courts to interpret the relevant jurisprudential and doctrinal issues 
regarding abortion’s legal landscape without definitive constitutional guidance. 
Finally, two pertinent cases involving both First and Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges are worth noting. The first, Planned Parenthood Minnesota 
 
2013).  
 32.  MKB Mgmt. Corp v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900 (D.N.D. 2013). 
 33.  Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D.Ariz. 2012). 
 34.  Issacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014). 
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v. Rounds,35 considered a provision of a South Dakota statute requiring that a 
woman seeking an abortion be made aware that the procedure could lead to an 
increased risk of suicide or suicidal ideation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that such a requirement represented an undue burden on 
women’s access to abortion, as the information was not proven to be truthful and 
was misleading. Thus, this informed consent provision violated women’s right to 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Additionally, 
the Eighth Circuit held that the required disclosures regarding suicide risk did 
compel physician speech, thereby infringing upon First Amendment protections. 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to enjoin the 
suicide advisory in the statute. 
The second case, Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Daugaard,36 addressed 
challenges to South Dakota’s informed consent provision. This provision, as 
amended in 2011, requires the fulfillment of four elements: “(1) the Pregnancy 
Help Center Requirements; (2) the 72-Hour Requirement; (3) the Risk Factors 
Requirement; [and] (4) the Coercion Provisions.”37 That is, women are required 
to visit a pregnancy help center in order to receive mandatory pre-abortion 
counseling, engage in a state-mandated waiting period of seventy-two hours 
after said counseling prior to receiving an abortion, be made aware of any risk 
factor (physical, psychological, and emotional) deemed by the state to be related 
to undergoing an abortion, and be asked to verify whether or not they are 
seeking an abortion as a result of coercion by another party.38 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of South Dakota granted a preliminary injunction, 
enjoining this legislation after finding it imposed an undue burden on women’s 
access to abortion. The seventy-two hour waiting period was only challenged on 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds; the other three informed consent 
statutory requirements were challenged on both due process and free speech 
grounds. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the federal 
district court.39 Currently, the only piece of legislation that remains enjoined is 
the seventy-two hour waiting period.40 
The Rounds and Daugaard cases have been subject to considerable scholarly 
analysis.41 For example, Erin Bernstein suggested that while disclosure 
requirements vary, they have the potential to promote public health in the 
context of abortion.42 In this regard, Bernstein proposed that a “uniform, 
mandatory disclosure” would benefit individuals in the abortion decision-
making process.43 Following a brief review of Rounds and Daugaard, Bernstein 
concluded that even when courts approach abortion laws like those of South 
 
 35.  Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 36.  Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052 (D.S.D. 2011). 
 37.  Personhood, supra note 7, at 136.  
 38.  Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. 
 39.  Id. at 1077. 
 40.  Id. at 1065. 
 41.  See, e.g., Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 
171, 182, 184-86  [hereinafter Upside to Abortion]; see also Informed Consent, supra note 7, 639–43 
(describing the limits and liabilities of abortion informed consent regulation on patient autonomy).  
 42.  Upside to Abortion, supra note 41, at 191.  
 43.  Id. at 177. 
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Dakota with skepticism, they remain reluctant to wholly invalidate the 
disclosure measures.44 As Bernstein notes, “twenty years after the Casey Court 
approved pre-abortion disclosure requirements, even skeptical courts are not 
likely to reject that decision’s embrace of the states’ power to compel truthful 
physician disclosures.”45 Bernstein additionally asserted that disclosure 
requirements should be used as “politically neutral regulatory tool[s]” and ought 
not to be politicized; instead, they should enhance a woman’s choice by engaging 
the public health system.46  Bernstein’s conclusion that these requirements have 
the possibility to promote public health stands in contrast to the conclusion of 
Aimee Furdyna based on bioethics and medical-decision-making. 
According to Aimee Furdyna, the portion of the South Dakota legislation 
left intact does impose an undue burden on women.47 Relying on a bioethical 
context for medical decision- making, Furdyna concluded that “[i]n enacting 
these pieces of legislation, the states have prescribed the exact process by which a 
patient may terminate a pregnancy, and have left the patient without any choice 
in the matter of her own care.”48 Furdyna suggested that South Dakota adopt a 
model enacted by other states, in which women receive printed material, 
including information mandated by the state. Under these circumstances, 
women would have the information easily available to them without infringing 
on their own or their physicians’ constitutional rights.49 
As demonstrated in the preceding review, the climate of abortion law and 
policy in the country is not static. Currently, inconsistencies remain in how 
decisions are reached by district and appellate courts – especially with respect to 
the standard of review (i.e. strict scrutiny and undue burden analysis). Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has had the opportunity to provide further constitutional 
guidance on the undue burden standard, it has chosen not to do so. Thus, until 
further jurisprudential or doctrinal guidance is provided on how to best interpret 
this standard in relation to state statutes, lower courts will continue to be 
presented with constitutional challenges to current abortion laws. 
Clearly, not every case that has addressed the constitutionality of abortion 
legislation favors a woman’s absolute right to reproductive freedom. Statutory 
challenges, however, continue to be raised in those states where the legislation 
increasingly attempts to erode a woman’s prerogative to choose. Thus, these 
state challenges provide a useful doctrinal context for assessing the current 
jurisprudential climate of abortion policy in the country, as well as a political 
context for assessing how restrictive state abortion legislation advances interests 
that may not be compatible with women’s needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 44.  Id. at 185. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 213–14. 
 47.  Informed Consent, supra note 7, at 642. 
 48.  Id. at 657. 
 49.  Id. at 661-62. 
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II. THEORY AND METHOD 
 
In this section, we address three core issues that inform and direct the 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the ensuing study. First, we 
present the constituent components of feminist standpoint epistemology (“FSE”). 
FSE contests the gendered (masculine) construction of knowledge claims. 
Second, we recount the elements of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionist method 
(“DDM”). DDM contests the meaning-making process on which all knowledge 
claims depend. Third, we describe the integration of FSE and DDM. This 
synthesis includes a delineation of the study’s qualitative research design as 
fitted to an examination of case or statutory law (such as North Carolina’s WRK 
Act), consistent with the critical philosophy of PJ.50 
 
A. Feminist Standpoint Epistemology 
 
As a theory, FSE is comprised of three general concepts: (1) knowledge is 
socially situated; (2) disenfranchised group members have access to information 
that non-group members do not possess; and (3) in order to produce more fully 
objective knowledge, research should begin in the lives of the marginalized.51 As 
an operating principle, FSE maintains that scientific research about girls and 
women must begin with the lived experiences of girls and women.52 For FSE, all 
knowledge is situated. Thus, all knowledge claims represent standpoints or 
positions from which meaning is generated. As such, FSE adherents contend that 
 
 50.  The proposed integration also comments on the importance of turning to standpoint 
epistemology and deconstructionist philosophy, especially if the aim is to advance a more fully 
objective (i.e., inclusive) science on public policy matters. This is science that accounts for how 
legislative decision-making politically and culturally embraces (or fails to embrace) the justice-based 
(i.e., equity and equality) realities of poor, vulnerable, or otherwise marginalized societal groups 
through state-level statutory enactments. As we explain, reliance on the epistemological and 
methodological grounding of this science to promote reform is compatible with the ethics-of-justice 
philosophy that functions as a core precept of PJ.         
 51.  See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 26–27 (1986) [hereinafter 
SCIENCE] (challenging the intellectual, political, and cultural foundations of scientific thought and 
reasoning); SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING FROM WOMEN’S 
LIVES 169–72 (1991) [hereinafter EPISTEMOLOGY] (delineating a feminist standpoint theory); SANDRA 
HARDING, THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER: INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES 
1-4 (2004) [hereinafter STANDPOINT THEORY] (detailing the development of the theory by several of its 
leading exponents); see also Janet Kourany, The Place of Standpoint Theory in Feminist Science Studies, 24 
HYPATIA 209 (2009) (analyzing the use of standpoint theory as a resource for feminist 
epistemology); Sharon Crasnow, Is Standpoint Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology?: An 
Introduction, 24 HYPATIA 189 (2009) (examining Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in relation to 
feminist epistemology).  
 52.  See SCIENCE, supra note 52, at 105–10 (explaining the gender biases found in scientific 
disciplines); see also IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 3 (2nd ed.) (explaining 
how theories and definitions of justice are cloaked in masculine norms of rights-claiming and 
reasoning); Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARVARD L. REV. 829, 829–36 [hereinafter 
Legal Method] (exploring the relevance of a woman’s lived reality as a part of cultivating feminist 
epistemology as contributing to feminist approaches to law); Kristina Rolin, Standpoint Theory as a 
Methodology for the Study of Power Relations, 24 HYPATIA 218, 218–20 (discussing the gendered 
construction of  lived reality). 
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the situated position of a knower is relevant to the production of knowledge.53 
Situated knowledge is rooted in Hegel’s analysis of the master-slave 
relationship.54 Hegel argued that oppression and injustice are best understood 
from the viewpoint of the slave, rather than that of the slave master, as it is the 
master who is bound by the work of the slave, rather than the slave bound by the 
master. 55 Thus, only when the subjugated (that is, the disenfranchised or 
marginalized) come to realize that the world around them has actually been 
crafted by their own work will  they then  be able to achieve self-consciousness 
and subsequently be able to experience collective release from their constructed 
alienation.56 
Consistent with this view, early feminist standpoint theorists attempted to 
counter the culture of accepted knowledge production. For example, grounding 
her argument in Marxist theory,57 Nancy Hartsock claimed that “if material life is 
structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two different groups, one can 
expect that the vision of each will represent an inversion of the other, and in 
systems of domination the vision available to the rulers will be both partial and 
perverse.”58 When social reality is structured in oppositional ways to advance 
only dominant values (master over the slave), then the dualities of human 
activity can never be fully acknowledged and the interdependencies of different 
groups can never be fully appreciated. Consequently, FSE maintains that 
perversions of knowledge production result from valuing only the masculine 
register and male vision regarding the dualities of gender. This is why FSE 
proponents contend that the situated knowledge of women makes possible a 
reconsideration of these dualities by “reversing the proper valuation of human 
activity.”59 
 
 53.  See EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note  52, at 270; Legal Method, supra note  53, at 867; see also Elizabeth 
Comack, Producing Feminist Knowledge: Lessons from Women in Trouble, 3 THEOR. CRIM. 287, 288-90 
(1999) [hereinafter Lessons] (describing feminist and standpoint knowledge production derived from 
the experience of doing research with women in prison). 
 54.  See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 115-19 (A.V. Miller trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1807) [hereinafter SPIRIT] (describing the dialectical and historical process 
through which consciousness or mind produces absolute or ideal knowledge about reality); see also 
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 129–41 (James M. Edie et al. ed., Parvis 
Emad & Kenneth Maly trans., Indiana Univ. Press 1988) (1980) (explaining Hegel’s conception of 
situated knowledge); JOHN RUSSON, READING HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY 70–95 (2004) (discussing 
Hegel’s use of the master-slave relationship); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, IN THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL: A STUDY 
OF G.W.F. HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 443–55 (1983) (same). 
 55.  SPIRIT, supra note  55; SCIENCE, supra note  52, at 111–19; David A. Duquette, Hegel: Social and 
Political Thought, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hegelsoc/. 
 56.  SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 117. 
 57.  For an overview of Marxist theory, see KARL MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC 
MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (A. Milligan, trans., International Publishers 1964) (1844). 
 58.  Nancy C. M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically 
Feminist Historical Materialism, in 161 DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 283, 285 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. 
Hintikka eds., 2nd ed. 2003) [hereinafter Historical Materialism] (analyzing and critiquing the 
philosophical grounding of the natural and social sciences with relevance for public policy concerns).  
 59.  Id. at 299. However, when this reversal (or inversion) is undertaken, something more 
fundamental is still needed. See FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE 192 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Penguin Books 1973) (1886) (stating that 
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Additionally, Catharine MacKinnon asserted that expressions of law are 
dominated by masculine logic and reasoning.60 To substantiate her view, she 
demonstrated how this dominance is expressed in the different-but-equal 
approach to legal equality claims. Specifically, MacKinnon argued that sex 
equality in the law becomes a contradiction in terms.61 When seeking legal 
equality, women must do so by maintaining that they are distinctly different 
from men. For women, however, equality under the rule of law still means being 
scrutinized under the existing conditions of equality as measured by the male 
standard. Thus, MacKinnon maintained that equality for women under the law is 
only possible when first accounting for the dominance of the male standard in 
the law.62 The concept of situated knowledge as advanced by FSE adherents 
suggests, then, that the inversion of traditionally valued (masculine) knowledge 
production may reveal both discourse and meaning that is currently obscured or 
absent in (legal) texts. 
The concept of situated knowledge as adopted by feminist standpoint 
theorists gives rise to a second core element of FSE, namely that disenfranchised 
groups have access to knowledge that non-group members lack. In this regard, 
disenfranchised or marginalized groups function as the “outsiders within,”63 
meaning that as individuals immersed within the values of the outsider, they 
have access to unique knowledge not accessible to the enfranchised. Retrieving 
this knowledge and expressing these values “offers resources for decreasing the 
partiality and distortion of research” as more inclusive knowledge production is 
increased.64 Thus, FSE proponents assert that, in conjunction with women’s 
 
“every elevation of the type ‘man’ has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society - and so it will 
always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between 
man and man and needs slavery in some sense or the other”). In his examination of post-
modernism’s relationship to law, criminology, and social justice, Bruce Arrigo writes: 
In short, the Hegelian thesis unwittingly functions to legitimize the power of the status quo 
through the act of reaction-negation. The slave responds to the voice and force of the 
master; the slave negates the words and the values of the master. However, the position 
and identity of the slave remains unchanged; dispossession and anonymity still pervade 
(and perniciously silence) the slave’s reality. 
BRUCE A. ARRIGO ET. AL., THE FRENCH CONNECTION IN CRIMINOLOGY: REDISCOVERING CRIME, LAW, 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 37−38 (2005) [hereinafter REDISCOVERING] (arguing that “a doctrine is needed 
powerful enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and destructive 
for the world-weary”).   
 60.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 1–17 
(1987) (explaining that aspects of the law specifically affecting women have been articulated in 
masculine terms).  
 61.  See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under the Law, 100 YALE L. J. 1281, 
1286-88 (1991) [hereinafter Reflections on Sex Equality] (exploring the tension between a view of 
equality as being the same as men and therefore being treated the same, and the existence of 
important differences like pregnancy).    
 62.  See Catherine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINIST 
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 81 (Katherine Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy, eds., 1991) 
(determining that recognition of the differences between the sexes is necessary for sex equality); 
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 
(1982) (inquiring into male dominance in the law). 
 63.   EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 52, at 131.  
 64.  Id. at 132; see also MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 1–8; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS 
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE ix–xvii (1989) [hereinafter THE STATE] (examining female 
experiences).  
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subordinate position in society, this “double vision” provides “a basis for 
feminist knowledge.”65 This is because women are able to access two worlds: 
“their own and that of the dominant group.”66 Double vision gives researchers an 
epistemic advantage in that they have access to previously concealed 
information that makes possible a more complete analysis and more inclusive 
knowledge production. 
Indeed, as Harding noted, it is only when one works on “both sides” that 
the possibility exists to uncover objective knowledge.67 Moreover, as she 
explained, “objectivity is increased by thinking out of the gap between the lives 
of ‘outsiders’ and the lives of ‘insiders’. . . [including] their favored conceptual 
schemes.”68 To accomplish this, scholars need to investigate the relationship 
between subject and object rather than “deny[ing] the existence of, or seek[ing] 
unilateral control over, this relation[ship].”69 Thus, FSE adherents maintain that 
objective knowledge production is made more likely when relying on the 
insider/outsider double vision within and out of which disenfranchised groups 
dwell. Moreover, this objectivity increases especially when oppositional 
standpoints (or knowledge claims) among group and non-group members are 
more closely examined for their potential mutuality and interdependence. 
Finally, precisely because disenfranchised group members have access to 
knowledge that non-group members lack, FSE contends that knowledge 
production must be grounded in the experiences of the marginalized. According 
to Harding, this strategy “leads us to ask questions about nature and social 
relations from the perspective of devalued and neglected lives.”70 Consistent 
with this reasoning, MacKinnon argued that “man has become the measure of all 
things”71 However, when knowledge production is grounded in the experiences 
of women as a disenfranchised segment of society, then it is possible to have a 
legal measurement that is not defined by or reduced to male-stream logic and 
meaning.  Indeed, under these conditions, women’s equality would not be 
“judged by [their] proximity to . . . [the masculine] measure.”72 Thus, grounding 
scholarship in the lives of the disenfranchised (including women), allows 
researchers the opportunity to uncover values and assumptions that other, more 
mainstream methods might be inclined to overlook or discount.73 
 
B. Derrida’s Deconstructionist Method 
 
Derrida’s deconstructionist method operates on many levels, and it is 
intended to explain the philosophical problem of how terms or values function in 
 
 65.  Lessons, supra note 54, at 290. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 52, at 191. 
 68.  Id. at 132. 
 69.  Id. at 152; see also Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 62, at 1298 (arguing that the 
“inequality of women to men deserves a theory of its own”).  
 70.  EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 52, at 150. 
 71.  THE STATE, supra note 65, at 220.  
 72.  Id. at 220–21. 
 73.  See STANDPOINT THEORY, supra note 52, at 1-13 (introducing standpoint theory as a site of 
political, philosophic, and scientific debate).  
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binary opposition as presented in texts and as spoken through systems of 
communication.74 The Derridean problem of binary opposition has been used to 
advance feminist theory and to account for the gendered construction of (legal) 
knowledge.75 For example, commenting on the transformational promise of 
feminist jurisprudence, Cornell noted that “we can and should understand the 
deconstructibility of law to open up the space for the reinterpretation and 
reinvocation that allows feminist inroads into the law.”76 These inroads re-
examine the situated knowledge terms and values that govern the administration 
of justice, reconsider the standpoint from and to which this reasoned and lived 
justice is rendered, and re-conceive the group-member status on which these 
claims should be made or these decisions should be reached.77 
Derrida’s deconstructionist method is grounded in three core theoretical 
concepts: (1) the metaphysics of presence; (2) the condition of logocentrism; and 
(3) the logic of how arguments undo themselves.78  Additionally, Derrida’s 
method consists of three main components: (1) the reversal of hierarchies; (2) the 
activities of différance; and (3) the performativity of the trace.79 DDM rests upon 
the notion that unspoken, obscured, and/or deferred values are lodged within 
texts. As a method, Derridean deconstruction offers an approach to locating 
these concealed and missing standpoints and to unpacking these knowledge-
producing and meaning-generating values.80 In what follows, we review the two 
 
 74.  See. e.g., REDISCOVERING, supra note  60, at 24-27 (summarizing Derrida’s epistemology and 
its critical potential for furthering social change and citizen justice);  Jack B. Balkin, Deconstructive 
Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L. J. 743, 785 (1987) [hereinafter Deconstructive Practice] (describing 
the theory and application of Derrida’s deconstructionist philosophy for law).     
 75.  DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND 
THE LAW 3 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers ed., Routledge 1991) (1999) [hereinafter ETHICAL 
FEMINISM]; JANE DURAN, TOWARD A FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY 163–67 (1995) [hereinafter FEMINIST 
EPISTEMOLOGY]; MOIRA GATENS, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY: PERSPECTIVES ON DIFFERENCE AND 
EQUALITY 112 (1991) [hereinafter DIFFERENCE AND EQUALITY]; PAM PAPADELOS, FROM REVOLUTION TO 
DECONSTRUCTION: EXPLORING FEMINIST THEORY AND PRACTICE IN AUSTRALIA 9 (2010).  
 76.  ETHICAL FEMINISM, supra note 76, at 111. 
 77.  BRUCE A. ARRIGO & DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, REVOLUTION IN PENOLOGY: RETHINKING THE 
SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 133-160 (2009) [hereinafter REVOLUTION] (theorizing prospects for advancing 
said ethics-of-justice through the critical phenomenology of the shadow and stranger).  
 78.  Derrida developed the theory and method of his deconstructionist philosophy over a series 
of controversial books and essays. See generally, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 6; JACQUES DERRIDA, 
MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., The Univ. of Chicago Press 1982) (1972) [hereinafter 
MARGINS]; POSITIONS, supra note 6. For useful overviews of Derrida’s deconstructionist philosophy see 
generally JOHN D. CAPUTO (ED.), DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES 
DERRIDA (1996) [hereinafter CONVERSATION]; JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982) 
[hereinafter ON DECONSTRUCTION]. The latter concept, arguments that undo themselves, addresses 
the complex relationship between speech, writing, and difference. See JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND 
DIFFERENCE 3–30 (Alan Bass trans., The Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) (1967) [hereinafter WRITING AND 
DIFFERENCE] (analyzing the relationship among these entities). Given that the ensuing study focuses 
on the NC WRK Act as a text to deconstruct, the Derridean concern for speech and writing will not be 
specifically featured. However, for commentary examining the relevance of Derrida’s notion that 
arguments undo themselves with particular attention to law, see, e.g., Deconstructive Practice, supra 
note 74, at 755-758 (explaining Derrida’s arguments); Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 64 
(same).  
 79.  Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 746−55; Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 
62−63.  
 80.  FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 76, at 164. Commenting on the reach of this method, 
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main theoretical concepts of DDM, and then explain the theory’s three principal 
methodological elements. The relationship between theory and method is also 
tacitly examined as a way to further convey what makes Derrida’s textual 
approach to the problem of binary oppositions so relevant to FSE and to the 
present study. 
 
1. Derrida and Theory as Method 
The metaphysics of presence introduces Derrida’s argument that there exist 
terms that are not just in binary opposition to one another but are also structured 
in a hierarchical manner.81 These “thought” hierarchies privilege one of the 
binary terms and subordinate the other.82 For example, in speech, the term 
“objective knowledge” eclipses the term “subjective knowledge”; the values 
assigned to “whiteness,” “maleness,” and “heterosexuality” displace the values 
assigned to “blackness,” “femaleness,” and “homosexuality.” For Derrida, the 
metaphysics of presence is a function of bias in Western thought, a bias that 
reveals the object of deconstruction. As Balkin succinctly noted, “Western 
conceptions of philosophy proceed from the hidden premise that what is most 
apparent to our consciousness – what is most simple, basic, or immediate – is 
most real, true, foundational, or important.”83  That is, what is most readily 
apparent to readers or listeners (for example, a text’s conventional, taken-for-
granted, or shared meaning) becomes the privileged truth of that text. This truth 
is accepted on its face, and it is valued for the assumed accurate (factual) 
information that it conveys.  The purpose of deconstruction in relation to the 
metaphysics of presence, then, is to “think beyond [the] identity [of each term] to 
unity.”84 This is meaning that is located in the mutuality of the terms or values 
that are positioned in binary opposition.  Thus, as a component of 
deconstructionist theory, the metaphysics of presence seeks “to counter the 
simple choice of one of the terms or one of the series against the other. . ., [by 
generating]. . . new concepts and new models.”85 These concepts emerge from a 
deconstructionist re-reading of a text’s “presencing” or privileging of meaning. 
Logocentrism explains why binary oppositions exist and why they are 
 
Duran suggested that, “no text is really a text in the standard sense; every text is what the reader (or 
interpreter) makes it, and every text (including those not literary) may be deconstructed.” Id. This 
view does not imply that all knowledge is relative or subjective; rather, it implies that the meaning-
making process is multi-layered and non-exhaustive. As Arrigo et al. explained, “[t]he task of 
deconstructionist analysis, then, is to identify the play of differences and the mutual 
interdependencies between  terms in a hierarchical opposition, as a way of demonstrating the 
positional, relational, and provisional nature of all phenomena… [and as a way of ensuring that] 
what is spoken or written is liberated from the author.” REDISCOVERING, supra note 60, at 26; see also 
Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 56 (examining the importance of deconstruction). 
 81.  OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 6, at 49; see also ON DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 92 
(“[P]hilosophy has been a ‘metaphysics of presence,’ the only metaphysics we know”).   
 82.  See Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 747 (stating that “for Derrida, hierarchies of 
thought are everywhere”); see also Psychological Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 366 (illustrating 
Derrida’s logic of hierarchies within the realm of mental health law). 
 83.  Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 747.    
 84.  CONVERSATION, supra note 79, at 152. 
 85.  WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 79, at 19. 
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structured hierarchically.86  To a significant degree, these concerns are linked to 
how the concept accounts for the underlying reasoning that informs the 
metaphysics of presence. Following Derrida, if the truth of a text is situated in 
what is most immediate and true to a reader, then a text is (unwittingly) stripped 
of meaning beyond that. Consequently, the writing itself is evaluated not by 
what is fully written, but by the logocentric argument that is presented.87 This 
reading of a text “send[s] everything. . . [other than the demonstrably true and 
factual argument] off to the periphery as mere rhetoric or ornamentation, letting 
the logic lead the letter.”88 Thus, given the condition of logocentrism, the activity 
of writing can only provide concretized (although incomplete) inscriptions of 
and for human life. These inscriptions render absent other unexamined readings 
of a text, and these concretized readings are re-enacted (i.e. re-lived as totalizing 
meaning) through the metaphysics of presence.89  For Derrida, “logocentrism. . . 
has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for essential 
reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing.”90 Indeed, the 
condition of logocentrism stabilizes the written word and, in the process, 
conceals the multiplicity of meaning or pluri-signification inherently available 
(and thus retrievable) in the written text.91 These readings are rendered absent 
when the logic of argumentation that is most present is then also privileged, or 
when terms or values in a hierarchical binary dominate the meaning-making 
process by subordinating the terms or values on which such binaries depend. 
The result is a finalized and sanitized text, devoid of the possibility of conveying 
more all-inclusive sense-making and corresponding knowledge production. 
 
2. Derrida and Method as Theory 
The problem of binary opposition, as explained through the metaphysics of 
presence and the condition of logocentrism, indicates that the theoretical footing 
of this problem depends on a method of re-reading texts (here, state-level 
statutes). The analytics of this method make evident how texts operate to convey 
privileged meaning and, in the process, displace or defer other forms of 
knowledge production. As a dimension of DDM, the reversal of hierarchies calls 
for the inversion of values in hierarchical opposition. The purpose of this reversal 
“is to ascertain what additional insights, if any, might be found in their 
reconstituted arrangement.”92 Additionally, “by switching. . . the hierarchies, one 
 
 86.  OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 6, at 50 (describing logocentrism as a “metaphysics of 
presence” that is motivated by a desire for a “transcendental signified”); REDISCOVERING, supra note 
60, at 25 (specifying how logocentrism implies that the “centrality of the first or dominant term masks 
and conceals the interdependence of both values”).                                 
 87.  Deconstructive Practice, supra note  75, at 757 (asserting that Derrida called for writing to 
“expose the hidden logocentric biases of Western thought”); see also Bruce A. Arrigo, Madness, 
Citizenship, and Social Justice: On the Ethics of the Shadow and the Ultramodern, 23 LAW & LIT. 405 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ethics of the Shadow] (exploring the ways in which control engulfs the “dialect that is the 
human agency/social structure duality”).  
 88.  CONVERSATION, supra note 79, at 83. 
 89.  Ethics of the Shadow, supra note 88, at 414−15. 
 90.  OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 6, at 43. 
 91. Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 62 (“[L]ogocentrism esteems limited interpretations 
of phenomena, subtending (even marginalizing) alternative readings of a text.”) 
 92. Id. (explaining that “To this end, deconstructive practice, as a method of critical inquiry, 
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can re-examine and re-think the mutual interdependence of both terms.”93 
Cornell addressed the paradox of achieving neutrality (objectivist science) when 
examining hierarchical oppositions within a text, and the requirement of a 
deconstructionist process that temporarily reverses terms or values in binary 
opposition. As she noted: 
“[R]ebellion against metaphysical oppositions cannot amount simply to 
a denial of their existence or an attempt to rise above them in already 
established ‘neutral’ discourse, there must be a ‘phase’ of 
overturning. . .necessary for the intervention into the hierarchical 
structure of opposition.”94 
Moreover, commenting on the objectivist potential of inversion, Bruce 
Arrigo and Dragan Milovanovic explained that the inversion process “decenters 
our favored ways of interpreting phenomena and invites us to consider other, 
potentially transformative configurations in which both terms are [or can be] 
valued.”95 Thus, when the term homosexuality is privileged over the term 
heterosexuality in a text, or when the value of race difference is hierarchically 
preferred over the value of race neutrality in discourse, this oppositional act 
turns a text on its head momentarily so that the reader can reconsider the 
meaning-making and knowledge production process.96 
For Derrida, specifying the valuation of both terms in a binary opposition 
draws attention to their mutual interdependencies.97 These interdependencies 
help to make explicit Derrida’s pluri-significant meaning for the concept of 
différance. As Balkin explained: 
Différance simultaneously indicates that (1) the terms of an oppositional 
hierarchy are differentiated from each other (which is what determines 
them); (2) each term in the hierarchy defers the other (in the sense of 
making the other term wait for the first term); and (3) each term in the 
hierarchy defers to the other (in the sense of being fundamentally 
dependent upon the other).98 
To illustrate, différance indicates how the two logocentric values for 
“straight” or “gay” are different from each other; how, given the metaphysics of 
presence (and absence), the spoken or written term postpones the other and how 
both values are mutually dependent on one another for their meaning-making 
and knowledge production identities. Thus, as Arrigo concluded, the more 
 
‘reveals and de-centers, although incompletely and temporarily, how legal arguments often disguise 
ideological positions.”).     
 93.  Id.; see Ethics of the Shadow, supra note 88, at 415−16; (examining the merits of 
deconstruction); Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 744−46 (discussing the merits of 
deconstructionism for lawyers).  
 94.  ETHICAL FEMINISM, supra note 76, at 95. 
 95.  REVOLUTION, supra note 78, at 76.   
 96.  DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 134 (3rd ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter SOCIOLOGY OF LAW]; see also Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 746-47 (explaining 
that the purpose of this inversion “is not to establish a new conceptual bedrock, but rather to 
investigate what happens when the given, ‘common sense’ arrangement is reversed”). 
 97.  See, e.g., POSITIONS, supra note 6, at 39−40; MARGINS, supra note 79, at 3.  
 98.  Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 752; see also Ethics of the Shadow, supra note 88, at 
415−16 (analyzing the concept of différance). 
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complete (objectivist) meaning of such binaries “emerges from [an assessment of] 
the interplay of differences and dependencies simultaneously operating within [a 
given] text.”99 
The final methodological component of DDM relevant to the proceeding 
assessment of North Carolina’s WRK Act is Derrida’s notion of the trace.100 In 
effect, the trace is an extension of différance. As Derrida observed, “if words and 
concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences [différance], one can 
justify one’s language, and one’s choice of terms only within a topic (an 
orientation in space) and an historical strategy.”101 Cornell further commented on 
this historical strategy by noting that “différance subverts the claim that ‘this is all 
there is!’ The [historical] trace of Otherness remains.”102  Stated differently, the 
value of one term in a hierarchical opposition is always and already contained 
within the value of the other term on which it (the privileged value) depends for 
communicating meaning and for generating knowledge.103 Thus, as Milovanovic 
concluded with respect to the trace and its performativity: 
[O]ne must start with the idea that any term (presence) always implies a 
hidden one (absence); both are essential to any meaning of each. The 
trace is that part that exists in each and maintains the relation. In many 
ways, it is the ‘glue.’ For those practicing [legal] deconstruction, the 
challenge is to identify the absent term which maintains the term that is 
felt as present.104 
 
 99.  Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 63. Gatens uses the example of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ 
when describing the concept of différance to further specify this point’s complexity. She argues that “if 
‘woman’ has meaning only in relation to its opposite ‘man’, and if ‘man’ is implicated in what it 
means to be ‘woman’, then a politics which basis itself on the irreducibility and specificity of 
women’s experience is bound to result in contradiction and incoherence.” Difference and Equality, 
supra note 76, at 112. These contradictions and incoherencies result from the differences between 
‘man’ and ‘woman’ which postpone, suspend, or repress each other, while also exposing how both 
terms are dependent on one another to more completely convey their uniqueness or distinctiveness. 
Thus, the activity of différance “disrupts … claims to [singular] identity.” by revealing the mutuality of 
terms in binary opposition. Ethical Feminism, supra note 76, at 140. 
 100.  See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 6, at 46-47; (explaining the notion of the trace); see also 
Deconstructive Practice, supra note  75, at 752−53 (same); Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 63 
(same ). 
 101.  OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 6, at 41. 
 102.  ETHICAL FEMINISM, supra note 76, at 108–09.  
 103.  The trace “is a metaphor for the effect of the opposite concept, which is no longer present 
but has left its mark on the concept [made present]. . .[.] The trace is what makes deconstruction 
possible[.]” Deconstructive Practice, supra note 75, at 752. 
 104.  SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 97, at 134 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the trace helps to 
explain both how and why method is inevitably linked to its “glue;” namely, the legacy of theory. But 
this legacy, as history, need not be built upon nihilism, foundationless positions, or the undecided 
“iterability” (i.e., inexhaustibility) of the text ad infinitum and ad nauseam. Id. at 135. Instead, a 
deconstructionist method can be deployed whose theoretical moorings promote virtue-based reform 
(i.e., an ethics-of justice). Commenting on the anchoring of method by way of said deconstructionist 
theory, Balkin offered the following observations: 
Any social theory must emphasize some human values over others. Such categorizing 
necessarily involves a privileging, which in turn can be deconstructed. But the goal of 
deconstruction is not the deconstruction of all possible social visions. Be recalling the 
elements of human life relegated to the margin in a given social theory, deconstructive 
readings [as method] challenge us to remake [re-historicize] the dominant conceptions 
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C. Qualitative Research Design105 
 
The ensuing study of North Carolina’s WRK Act is guided by PJ’s 
underlying ethics-of-justice philosophy. Fundamentally, this philosophy 
addresses the question: “How and for whom is justice served (or denied) by 
prevailing [judicial or legislative] decisions and practices?”106 This query guides 
the presentation and discussion of the proceeding data. As an operating 
principle, PJ probes this question by relying on theory that can “describe, 
explain, and predict law by reference to human behavior.”107  Stated differently, 
reliance on such theory makes possible a diagnosis of the condition (i.e. the 
equity means and equality measures) of justice dignified and affirmed at various 
levels of reality construction (that is, structurally, institutionally, and 
individually). With respect to the North Carolina WRK Act, the ensuing ethics-
of-justice inquiry focuses on how the statute fairly dignifies and proportionately 
affirms the lived experiences of a woman. It is these experiences that are under 
critical consideration. 
In what follows, we explain how the assimilation of FSE and DDM provides 
the requisite analytics by which to account for congressional attitudes, 
predispositions, and values (intra-textual legislative intent), and the necessary 
empirics by which to comment on how these themes reveal and relay the 
political and cultural dynamics of abortion policy in North Carolina (intra-
textual legislative ideology). To address these matters, we delineate the key 
points of integration that exist between FSE and DDM, indicate how they will be 
deployed in the thematic evaluation of the statute, and identify where this 
assimilation furthers PJ’s critical philosophy of ethically-animated inquiry. For 
simplification purposes, we refer to each of these points of integration as 
synthetic postulates. 
 
1. Integrating FSE and DDM: Four Synthetic Postulates 
 
[theories] of our society.” 
 
105.      As a point of departure, we note that our qualitative research design shares several 
affinities with critical discourse analysis (CDA). See generally NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, CRITICAL 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: THE CRITICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGE (1995); NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, ANALYZING 
DISCOURSE: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (2003); MICHELLE M. LAZAR, FEMINIST CRITICAL 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: GENDER, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY IN DISCOURSE (2005). CDA animates a text (e.g., 
a state statute, a legal case) by identifying how it functions as a form of socio-political practice (i.e., 
ideology) made evident by a re-reading of the text’s hidden commentary on or about power relations 
and forms of domination. See NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, LANGUAGE AND POWER 1–13 (2nd ed. 2001) 
(analyzing the methodology of CDA); DISCOURSE STUDIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 
VOLUME 1 at 1–34 (Teun A. van Dijk ed., 2nd ed. 2011) (1997) (same); RUTH WODAK & MICHAEL 
MEYER, METHODS OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  1–33 (2nd ed. 2009) (same). We are interested in 
how a text (Section 1 the NC WRK ACT) can be read for what it both reveals and conceals about a 
woman, the exercise of her reproductive freedom, and meaning-making and knowledge production 
about both of them. The integration of FSE and DDM provides a novel rubric by which to critically 
analyzing the discourse that constitutes the statute.  PJ’s ethics-of-justice orientation provides a novel 
approach by which to direct and undertake this CDA-informed textual inquiry.   
106.     Justice and Deconstruction, supra note 6, at 55. 
107.    Small, supra note 2, at 11.  
Arrigo_jci (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2015  3:07 PM 
 Critique of North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act 75 
 
Postulate 1: Socially constructing reality (i.e., the meaning-making and knowledge 
production process) occurs from within value-based systems of communication. 
The North Carolina WRK Act will be reread to consider how it socially 
constructs reality (the administration of equity and equality under the law) for a 
woman, how it dignifies and affirms one’s right to an abortion (reproductive 
freedom), and how the Act communicates meaning for and produces knowledge 
about both. In other words, consistent with PJ, this re-reading of the statute will 
identify all ethics-of-justice themes that begin to answer the following question: 
how and for whom is justice fairly and proportionately distributed within and 
throughout the legislation as form of policy prescription? 
 
Postulate 2: Value-based systems of communication convey meaning and generate 
knowledge by depending on the use of terms that reveal the most evident of truths and 
relay the most apparent of facts (the metaphysics of presence). The hierarchical 
presencing (i.e., preferring) of these terms conceals the oppositional values on which such 
preferred terms depend. The ongoing suppression of these oppositional values (and their 
corresponding terms) is a condition in which meaning is totalized and knowledge is 
concretized (the condition of logocentrism). 
The identified ethics-of-justice themes and their corresponding construction 
of a woman’s fair and proportionate interests present an evident version of a 
woman’s lived reality. The way in which this reality is communicated through 
the statute signifies underlying legislative intent. This intent consists of 
embedded attitudes, covert predispositions, and preferred values, which reveal 
and relay how North Carolina’s legislature chooses to socially construct the 
equity (the means of justice) and equality (the measures of justice) of a woman’s 
reality with respect to abortion and reproductive freedom, as well as knowledge 
about both. All data points of legislative intent will be identified, including: (a) 
embedded attitudes on or about abortion rights; (b) covert predispositions on or 
about reproductive freedom; and (c) hidden preferences concerning meaning for 
and knowledge about both abortion rights and reproductive freedom. 
 
Postulate 3: When meaning for and knowledge about marginalized groups (e.g., 
women, persons of color, sexual assault survivors, the poor and homeless) are rendered 
absent within the prevailing texts of socially constructed reality, such absence defers 
meaning and postpones knowledge that, when made present, makes possible a more 
completely objective (or scientifically inclusive) rendering of lived reality or human 
experience. 
A theme-based delineation of data points regarding congressional intent as 
lodged within the North Carolina WRK Act makes both present and absent the 
political and cultural dynamics of abortion policy in North Carolina. The 
incompleteness in what is revealed constitutes the presence of ideology; the 
continued postponement of what is concealed renders absent the construction of 
a more fully objective and inclusive science of meaning-making and knowledge 
production. Each instance of legislative intent will be deconstructed for what it 
does and does not make evident about a woman, abortion, and meaning for and 
knowledge about each. Consistent with PJ’s emphasis on human behavior, these 
intra-textual data points indicate how the statute fairly dignifies and 
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proportionately affirms the lived realities of a woman. These data will be 
delineated, mindful of the Act’s: (a) concealed attitudes on or about abortion, (b) 
covert predispositions toward reproductive freedom, and (c) hidden preferences 
concerning knowledge of and about either or both of them. 
 
Postulate 4: In order to further this more objectivist science, socially constructing 
reality (i.e., meaning-making and knowledge production) should begin in the lives of 
those who are marginalized. To be situated within this reality, hierarchical oppositions 
must be temporarily reversed, the interplay of differences (différance) and the 
interdependencies of binary terms in opposition must be enumerated and deconstructed, 
and the specification of the terms or values that linger in the other’s meaning (the trace’s 
performativity) must be made explicit. 
A more precise (diagnosis of how and to what extent the WRK Act dignifies 
and affirms the ethics-of-justice interests of a woman’s lived reality is itself 
incomplete, unless the hierarchical and oppositional terms and values on which 
these equity and equality experiences depend are themselves subjected to 
additional deconstruction. The statute’s terms and values that represent data 
points of legislative ideology regarding a woman, abortion, and reproductive 
freedom will be reexamined. The oppositional binaries on which each of them 
depends to convey meaning and to produce knowledge will be temporarily 
reversed, the free play of this text as différance will be explored, and the trace of 
each instance of legislative ideology will be made present. 
 
III. DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION108 
 
A. Data Presentation 
1. Synthetic postulate #1 
Four ethics-of-justice (EJ 1-4) themes are located within Section 1 of the 
North Carolina WRK Act. These themes begin to specify how and for whom 
equality and equity are administered through the legislation’s policy 
prescription.109 The themes are made apparent in how the statute presents them. 
 
108.     All data points for the ensuing study are derived from the Woman’s Right to Know Act, 
ch. 90, 2011 N.C. Laws 405.  Although the speech-and-display portion of the Act was permanently 
enjoined following the case of Stuart v. Huff, supra note 21, the Act’s ultrasound requirement remains 
a source of contestation within the State, and it is the source of political and cultural reality 
construction in the U.S. To illustrate, “currently[,] twenty-three states regulate the provision of 
ultrasounds by abortion providers…[of these] twelve require verbal counseling or written 
materials…three states require the health care provider to show and describe the ultrasound image, 
while nine states require the provider to offer the opportunity to view the image.” See Snehal Trivedi, 
North Carolina to Appeal Court Decision that Abortion and Ultrasound Violates the First Amendment, 
CAMPBELL LAW OBSERVER (Sept. 2, 2014),  http://campbelllawobserver.com/2014/02/north-carolina-
to-appeal-court-decision-that-abortion-and-ultrasound-law-violates-the-first-amendment/. 
109.     Excluded from the data were themes commenting on: (1) the maintenance of a government 
web site; (2) the requirements in case of a medical emergency; (3) the requirements of reporting; (4) 
civil remedies; (5) privacy protection in court proceedings; (6) the assurance of informed consent; (7) 
the assurance that consent is freely given; and (8) severability. These data address the procedural 
rather than the substantive equity and equality interests of a woman under Section 1 of the NC WRK 
Act, and a CDA-informed assessment of this text is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Also 
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Specifically, these themes are made self-evident through their statutory 
identification as WRK Act sub-sections. Table 1 summarizes the socially 
constructed rendition of justice (the means of equity and the measures of 
equality) that each theme makes present, embraces, and affirms for a woman 
with respect to abortion, reproductive freedom, and meaning for or knowledge 
about both of them. 
 
Table 1: Statutory Data for Synthetic Postulate #1  
 
Ethics‐of‐Justice 
Themes 
Equity and Equality Realities for a Woman 
The  definition  of 
relevant terms 
Eleven terms (and their definitions) are essential to the 
WRK  Act’s  composition  and  meaning.  These  terms 
include:  (1)  abortion;  (2)  attempt  to  perform  an 
abortion; (3) the North Carolina Department of Health 
and  Human  Services  (NCHHS);  (4)  the  real‐time 
display of the unborn child; (5) medical emergency; (6) 
physician;  (7)  probable  gestational  age;  (8)  qualified 
professional;  (9)  qualified  technician;  (10)  stable 
Internet website; and (11) woman.  
The  requirements  of 
informed consent 
There  are  four  conditions  that must  be met  before  a 
woman’s  consent  to  an  abortion  can  be  considered 
informed  and  voluntary  under  the  law.  These 
conditions  include:  1)  a  twenty‐four  hour  waiting 
period;  (2)  the  receipt  of  specific  information  that 
explains  the  benefits  of  choosing  life  and  that 
identifies the alternatives to abortion; (3) participation 
in and completion of a certification procedure; and (4) 
a  process  for  physicians  that  verifies  their  receipt  of 
said certification.
The  requirements  of 
printed information 
Two  sets of  information must be published or made 
available  to  ensure  that  the  State  has  fulfilled  its 
obligations  to  a woman who  seeks  an  abortion. One 
set requires the dissemination of NCHHS information 
on alternatives  to abortion;  the other  set  requires  the 
dissemination  of  medical  and  health  information 
about the unborn child. 
 
The  requirements of an 
ultrasound 
 
There are several duties  that a physician or qualified 
technician must perform in order to fulfill that expert’s 
obligations  to  provide  an  ultrasound  of  the  unborn 
child  to a woman  so  that  she  can make an  informed 
decision  about  the  exercise  of  her  reproductive 
freedom.  These  duties  encompass  both  medical 
treatment  and  professional  (medico‐legal)  practice 
 
excluded from the data were themes commenting on the equity and equality interests of a minor 
under the Act (e.g., the requirements of informed consent for an unemancipated minor).   
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requirements. 
 
2. Synthetic postulate #2 
The statute’s legislative intent consists of embedded attitudes, covert 
predispositions, and preferred values. These data reveal and relay how the North 
Carolina legislature elects to socially construct the realities of equity (the means 
of justice) and equality (the measures of justice) or a woman, with regard to 
abortion, reproductive freedom, and knowledge about them. Table 2 lists these 
data based on the four previously delineated ethics-of-justice themes. 
 
Table 2: Statutory Data for Synthetic Postulate #2 
 
Abortion Attitudes  Reproductive Freedom 
Predispositions
Preferred Values 
Abortion  shall  be 
understood  by  and 
will  depend  on  its 
essential  definitions, 
terms,  and 
conditions. 
These essential definitions, terms, 
and  conditions  establish  the 
linguistic coordinates of meaning 
and  knowledge  by  and  through 
which North Carolina’s WRK Act 
shall  fairly  and  proportionately 
legislate  over  a  woman’s 
reproductive freedom. 
These  linguistic 
coordinates  value  a 
woman  and  her 
rights  within  the 
contexts  of  valuing 
the  rights  (and 
responsibilities)  of 
all  relevant 
stakeholders. 
All  legally 
authorized abortions 
depend on a woman 
satisfying  the 
informed  and 
voluntary  consent 
terms and conditions 
of the State. 
The  exercise  of  a  woman’s 
reproductive  freedom  depends 
on her fulfilling the State’s means 
and measures of justice. These are 
the  fair  and  proportionate 
coordinates of meaning by which 
a  woman  satisfies  the  State’s 
informed  and  voluntary  consent 
conditions. For the condition of a 
24‐hour waiting period, the terms 
indicate  that  a  woman  must 
consult in person or by telephone 
with  a  physician  or  qualified 
professional  so  that  she  is 
apprised of all:  
 
(a)  medical  risks  (i.e.,  to  self  if 
abortion is or is not chosen);  
(b)  risks  to  life  (i.e., by  reporting 
the  child’s  probable  gestational 
age  at  time  of  abortion,  by 
making  it  possible  to  view  the 
unborn  child  through  available 
ultrasound  imaging and  to  listen 
to  the  unborn  child  through 
In  order  for  a 
woman  to  fully 
satisfy  the  State’s 
informed  and 
voluntary  consent 
provisions, she must 
know  the  time‐
sensitive  risks  to 
having  an  abortion 
(to  self)  and  know 
the  time‐sensitive 
benefits  of  not 
having  an  abortion 
(to  self  and  unborn 
child).  The  State 
recognizes  that  the 
risks  have  been 
made  fully  known 
only  after  the 
completion  of  a 
formalized  rights‐
conscious  and 
information 
gathering  process 
and  an  iterative 
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available  heart  tone  monitoring, 
and  by  identifying  the  available 
hospital support); and  
(c)  economic  risks  (i.e.,  to  self, 
should  an  abortion be  attempted 
or  performed  incorrectly  by  an 
uninsured physician).  
 
For the condition requiring that a 
woman  receive  specific 
information  that  explains  the 
benefits of choosing  life and  that 
identifies  the  alternatives  to 
abortion,  the  terms  indicate  that 
she must consult  in person or by 
way  of  telephone  with  a 
physician  or  qualified 
professional  at  least  24  hours 
prior to the abortion so that she is 
apprised  of  the  medical,  public, 
legal  and  human  service 
assistance  programs,  services, 
and/or  rights,  that  she  is entitled 
to or might be eligible to receive. 
 
For  the  condition  requiring  a 
certification procedure,  the  terms 
indicate  that  a  woman’s 
acknowledged  consent  depends 
on  the  creation  and maintenance 
of an official  (medical  file) and a 
duplicate  (copy  to  the  woman) 
written  record. For  the  condition 
requiring a process for physicians 
that  verifies  their  receipt  of  said 
certification,  the  terms  indicate 
that  the  physician  or  qualified 
technician  who  will  perform  the 
abortion must receive a copy of a 
woman’s certification.  
documented 
procedure.   
 
The  State  shall print 
and  make  digitally 
available 
information  that 
informs  the  choice 
not  to  abort  that  a 
person  of  “ordinary 
 
The  exercise  of  a  woman’s  fully 
informed  and  voluntary 
reproductive  freedom  depends 
on  her  receipt  of  two  types  of 
information. One type documents 
the  available  public  and  private 
agency  assistance  – from 
In order for the State 
to  satisfy  its 
requirement  to 
inform  a  woman  of 
ordinary  intelligence 
of her right to know, 
the State must make 
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intelligence”  can 
comprehend.   
pregnancy,  to  childbirth,  to 
potential  adoption  –  that  a 
woman has a right to know. This 
includes ultrasound  imaging and 
heart  tone  monitoring  services. 
The other type:  
 
(a) provides scientific information 
about the life status of the unborn 
child  based  on  two‐week 
gestational increments;  
(b)  includes  a  statement 
indicating  that  “life  begins  at 
conception  [and  that]  abortion 
will  terminate  the  life of  another 
human being. . .”; and  
(c)  specifies  the  medical 
(including  psychological)  risks 
associated  with  abortion,  which 
consist  of  risks  stemming  from 
various  abortion  procedures  and 
risks  stemming  from  the  choice 
not to abort.  
available 
information  that 
affirms  the  choice  to 
not  abort,  that 
dignifies  the  life  of 
the  unborn  child, 
and  that  affirms  a 
woman’s  life  should 
she  choose  to  carry 
the  pregnancy  to 
term. 
All  legally 
authorized abortions 
depend on a woman 
satisfying  the 
ultrasound  terms 
and conditions of the 
State. 
 
The  informed  exercise  of  a 
woman’s  reproductive  freedom 
depends  on  her  fulfilling  the 
State’s  means  and  measures  of 
justice.  These  are  the  fair  and 
proportionate  coordinates  of 
meaning  by  which  a  woman’s 
choice  (to  abort  or  not)  satisfies 
the State’s requirements.  
 
For  the  substantial  condition 
requiring a physician or qualified 
technician  to  perform  an 
obstetrics  ultrasound,  the  terms 
indicate that a woman has a right 
to  know  what  the  “presence, 
location,  and  dimensions  of  the 
unborn  child  [are]  within  the 
uterus and the number of unborn 
children depicted [therein].”  
 
For  the  substantial  condition 
requiring a physician or qualified 
technician  to  display  the 
ultrasound  images of  the unborn 
The  State  recognizes 
that  a  woman’s 
choice  to  abort  is 
legal  in  substance, 
only  after  a  medical 
expert  takes  images 
of,  explains  the  life 
status  of,  and 
displays  a  real‐time 
view  of  the  unborn 
child. 
 
The  State  recognizes 
that  a  woman’s 
choice  to  abort  is 
operationally  legal, 
only  after  the 
completion  of  a 
formalized  rights‐
conscious  and 
information  sharing 
process  and  an 
iterative 
documented 
procedure  in  which 
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child,  the  terms  indicate  that  a 
woman  has  a  right  to  view  the 
images.  For  the  substantial 
condition  requiring  a  physician 
or  qualified  technician  to 
“provide a medical description of 
the ultrasound images,” a woman 
has a right to know the life status 
of  the  unborn  child  (e.g., 
“dimension  of  the  embryo  or 
fetus,”  and/or  “presence  of 
external  members  and  internal 
organs”).   
 
For  the  operational  condition 
requiring a physician or qualified 
technician  to  obtain  a  woman’s 
written  certification,  the  terms 
indicate  that  the  abortion 
depends  on  her  acknowledging 
that  the  State  complied with  the 
Act’s  ultrasound  requirements, 
and  it depends on her  indication 
of  “whether  or  not  she  availed 
herself of the opportunity to view 
the image.”  
 
For  the  operational  condition 
requiring  a  process  that  verifies 
receipt  of  said  certification,  the 
terms  indicate  that  the physician 
or  qualified  technician  who  will 
perform  the  abortion  must 
receive  a  copy  of  a  woman’s 
written  certification  for  medical 
filing purposes  to be kept  for no 
less than seven years.
a  woman  declares 
and verifies whether 
or  not  she  viewed 
the  displayed 
ultrasound image. 
 
 
3. Synthetic postulate #3 
The statute’s ideology (the political and cultural dynamics of abortion in 
North Carolina) is made evident by deconstructing each instance of legislative 
intent. The data in Table 3 explicate what is present and absent in each instance 
of legislative intent with respect to a woman, reproductive freedom, and 
meaning for and knowledge about either or both of them, mindful of the four 
ethics-of-justice (EJ 1-4) themes by which the North Carolina WRK Act is 
constructed. 
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Table 3: Statutory Data for Synthetic Postulate #3 
Deconstructing Legislative Intent 
 
EJ 1: The Definition of Relevant 
Terms 
 
A woman exists and possesses rights 
relationally. This relational status (as 
patient, as citizen, as potential child-
bearer and mother) and these 
relational rights (to abort the unborn 
child, to knowingly exercise one’s 
reproductive freedom) depend on 
terms whose meanings produce the 
State’s rendition of relational 
knowledge. Absent from this relational 
existence, rights-claiming, and 
knowledge production, however, is the 
relational knowing that a woman lives 
as patient, citizen, and as child-bearer 
and mother. Stated differently, the 
meaning-making and knowledge 
production present in the statute defers 
(renders absent) a woman’s knowledge 
about what it means to live her 
relational role-sets in contemporary 
society.   
EJ 2: The Requirements of Informed 
Consent 
 
A woman’s relational status as patient, 
citizen, and potential child-bearer and 
mother requires that she know the 
risks (to self) of having an abortion and 
know the benefits of not having an 
abortion (to self and to child). The life 
of the woman and the unborn child are 
in a relationship mediated by the State 
through information from medicine, 
science, and law. However, absent 
from consideration are the risks to a 
woman when abortion is not chosen 
and the benefits to a woman when 
abortion is chosen. Stated differently, 
the meaning-making and knowledge 
production present in the statute defers 
(renders absent) a woman’s knowledge 
about what it means to live the risks of 
choosing to not abort and what it 
means to live the benefits of choosing 
to abort. No formalized rights-
conscious information gathering 
process or iterative documented 
procedure exists that informs a woman 
of or about this. 
EJ 3: The Requirements of Printed 
Information 
The State’s relational knowledge-
sharing with a woman makes present 
information that supports her status as 
a potential childbearing and potential 
child-rearing patient and citizen. It also 
makes present health status 
information about the unborn child as 
a patient and life status information 
about the unborn child as a person- 
citizen. However, the State renders 
absent information about what it 
means to live the patient or citizen 
status as an actual child-bearer and 
mother. Moreover, the State renders 
absent information about what it 
EJ 4: The Requirements of an 
Ultrasound 
The State’s relation knowledge on or 
about abortion makes the unborn child 
present to a woman. This presence is 
virtualized, described and possibly 
displayed to a woman. The medical 
process on which the presencing of the 
unborn child depends is also 
procedurally subject to confirmation 
and verification. However, the State 
renders absent a woman’s lived 
experience when choosing not to abort 
the unborn child. This reality is not 
virtualized, described, or displayed by 
a (medical) expert. No formalized 
rights-conscious information gathering 
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means for a woman’s child to live the 
actual status of patient and citizen in 
contemporary society.  
process or iterative documented 
procedure exists that informs a woman 
of or about this. 
 
 
4. Synthetic postulate #4 
The data points of legislative ideology reveal the cultural and political 
dynamics (e.g., power relations, forms of domination) of abortion policy. This 
ideology is a hidden or deferred text that is communicated through terms and 
values that are in hierarchical and binary relations of meaning-making and 
knowledge production. These relations can be made more evident by a re-
reading (a deconstruction) of the Act’s text. Mindful of the statute’s four ethics-
of-justice themes, data in Table 4 specify the Act’s ideology concerning a woman, 
abortion, and reproductive freedom, and the table inverts the hierarchical terms 
and values on which this ideological meaning depends in order to make present 
more complete (objective and inclusive) knowledge about a woman’s lived 
equity and equality interests. This inversion reveals the trace of an (un)known 
justice. 
 
Table 4: Statutory Data for Synthetic Postulate #4 
 
Themes  Legislative Ideology The  Trace  and  a  Woman’s 
(Un)known Justice 
The  definition 
of  relevant 
terms  
The terms on which relational 
knowing  about  abortion  and 
the  exercise  of  a  woman’s 
reproductive  freedom  are 
defined  by  the  State  render 
absent her lived experience of 
being  a  patient,  citizen,  and 
child‐bearer,  and  mother. 
Thus,  law’s  power  defines  a 
woman  and  her  “right  to 
know”  on  its  own 
“performative”  terms.  These 
are the terms (and values) of a 
non‐inclusive objectivity.   
When  citizenship,  healthcare, 
and  reproductive  freedom 
depend  on  the  administration 
of  gendered  justice,  then  the 
right  to  know  is  made  more 
complete.  The  fairness  and 
proportionality  of  this  more 
inclusive justice would depend 
on  statutory  terms  and 
definitions  that  revealed  and 
relayed  the  lived  experiences 
of a woman in order to convey 
deeper  meaning  about  and 
establish  fuller  relational 
knowing  regarding  abortion, 
the  unborn  child,  a  woman’s 
existence,  and  her  rights‐
claiming.  This  meaning  and 
knowing  constitute  an 
(un)known justice. 
 
The 
requirements 
of  informed 
consent 
The  terms  and  conditions  on 
which  a  woman  satisfies  the 
State’s  informed  and 
voluntary  consent  provision 
When the law’s performativity 
on  the  matter  of  a  woman’s 
voluntary  and  informed 
consent  is  subject  to 
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require  that  she  know  the 
risks to herself when abortion 
is  chosen  as  well  as  the 
benefits  to  herself  and  the 
unborn child when abortion is 
not  chosen.  Rendered  absent 
or deferred  in  the  statute  are 
the  risks  that  a  woman  (and 
the  child)  experiences  when 
choosing not to abort and the 
benefits  that  a  woman 
experiences when choosing to 
abort.  Thus,  the  law’s 
performativity makes evident 
that  its  informed  and 
voluntary  consent  provision 
is derived from the terms and 
values  of  a  non‐inclusive 
objectivity.  
deconstructionist  inversion, 
then  a  woman’s  justice 
depends  on  terms  and  values 
that make present:  
 
(1)  the  lived  risks  of  child 
forfeiture  (e.g.,  foster care and 
adoption); and  
(2)  the  lived  benefits  of  not 
(yet)  mothering  and  raising  a 
child  (e.g.,  reproductive 
freedom  and  non‐child 
dependency).  
The 
requirements 
of  printed 
information 
The terms and conditions that 
satisfy  the  State’s 
requirements  to  make 
available  printed  right‐to‐
know  abortion  information 
depend on:  
 
(1)  affirming  the  health  and 
citizenship  status  of  the 
woman as a potential mother; 
and  
(2)  affirming  the  health,  life, 
and  citizenship  status  of  the 
unborn  child  as  a  potential 
person.  
 
Rendered  absent  or  deferred 
in  the  statute  are  a woman’s 
actual  experiences  of 
childbearing  and  mothering 
both  as  a  patient  and  as  a 
citizen. Also  rendered  absent 
or concealed in the statute are 
the  actual  health,  life,  and 
citizenship  experiences  of 
personhood  for  the  child. 
Thus,  the  law’s 
performativity makes evident 
that  its  printed  information 
When the law’s performativity 
on  the  matter  of  the  State’s 
printed  information 
requirements  is  subject  to 
deconstructionist  inversion, 
then  a  woman’s  justice 
depends  on  terms  and  values 
that make present:  
 
(1)  the  health  and  social 
realities  of  child‐bearing  and 
mothering,  especially  mindful 
of  class  and  race  effects;  and 
(2)  the  health  and  social 
realities of personhood  for  the 
child,  especially  mindful  of 
class, race, and gender effects. 
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requirements  are  derived 
from the terms and conditions 
of a non‐inclusive objectivity.  
The 
requirements 
of  an 
ultrasound 
The  terms  and  conditions  on 
which  a  woman  satisfies  the 
State’s  ultrasound 
requirements  depend  on  her 
consent  to  the  presencing  of 
the  unborn  child  performed 
as  a  series  of  duties  by  the 
attending  physician  or 
medical  expert.  The 
confirmation  and  verification 
of  this  process  legitimizes 
these  presences.  Rendered 
absent  in  this process are  the 
presences of a woman’s life as 
a  mother  and  caregiver, 
derived  from  the  realities  of 
her  economic,  political,  and 
socio‐cultural  condition  or 
status.    These  “real  time” 
realities  are  not  virtualized, 
described, or displayed by an 
expert. No process exists  that 
concretizes  the  legitimacy  of 
these  presences.  Thus,  the 
law’s  performativity  makes 
evident  that  its  ultrasound 
requirements are based on the 
terms  and  conditions  of  a 
non‐inclusive objectivity.
When the law’s performativity 
on  the  matter  of  the  State’s 
ultrasound  requirements  is 
subject  to  deconstructionist 
inversion,  then  a  woman’s 
justice  depends  on  terms  and 
values  that  privilege  the  “real 
time”  and  lived  realities  of 
mothering  and  care‐giving, 
mindful of:  
 
(1)  the  type,  the access  to, and 
the  quality  of  available  State 
assistance services; and  
(2  the  availability  of  financial, 
familial, political,  and  cultural 
capital. 
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B. Data Discussion: PJ and Diagnosing the North Carolina WRK Act 
 
Given the presentation of data, one clear and compelling human behavioral 
finding is now discernible. The statutory construction of North Carolina’s WRK 
Act makes evident that on the matter of abortion and reproductive freedom, a 
woman exists in her absence. In what follows, we specify the empirical contexts in 
which this ethics-of-justice epistemology is recognizable in the statute and 
indicate what this ideological construction means for a woman, for her 
reproductive choice, and for the cultivation of a more fully objective science of 
meaning-making and knowledge generation. 
 
Table 5: The North Carolina WRK Act and the Epistemology of a 
Woman’s Absence 
 
Ethics‐of‐Justice 
Themes 
Means  and  Measures  of 
Justice
Abortion Ideology 
Relevant  definitions, 
terms,  conditions,  and 
values 
The fairness of  justice and the 
proportionality  of  justice 
depend on relational knowing 
and rights‐claiming. 
Relational  knowing 
for  a  woman  who 
seeks  an  abortion 
means  that her choice 
must  be  made  based 
on statutory  language 
that  excludes 
definitions,  terms, 
conditions, and values 
that  account  for  the 
realities  of  being  a 
citizen,  patient,  child‐
bearer, and mother. 
The  requirements  of 
informed consent 
The fairness of  justice and the 
proportionality  of  justice 
depend  on  a  woman’s 
knowledge  of  particular  risks 
and  benefits  that  make  her 
choice  informed  and 
voluntary. 
These  risks  exclude 
information  on  or 
about  the  realities  of 
child  forfeiture  that  a 
woman  confronts 
when  choosing not  to 
abort.  These  benefits 
exclude information on 
or  about  a  woman’s 
experiences  of 
remaining childless. 
The  requirements  of 
printed information 
 
The fairness of  justice and the 
proportionality  of  justice 
depend on a woman’s  receipt 
and knowledge of health and 
citizenship  information  that 
affirms both her potential as a 
mother and the unborn child’s 
potential as a person. 
These  requirements 
exclude  from 
dissemination  printed 
information  that 
accounts for the actual 
health and citizenship 
realities  of  mothering 
and  the  actual  health 
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and  citizenship 
realities  of 
personhood. 
 
The requirements of an 
ultrasound 
The fairness of  justice and the 
proportionality  of  justice 
depend  on  a  woman’s 
knowledge  of  the  unborn 
child’s physical  existence  and 
health  condition  made 
possible  by  a  virtual, 
descriptive, and/or “real time” 
display of the fetus. 
These  requirements 
exclude  from  “real 
time”  view  the  lived 
experience  of 
mothering  and  child 
care‐giving,  given 
stratification effects.110 
 
Each ethics-of-justice theme identified in Table 5 communicates something 
of relevance about the fair (equity) and proportionate (equality) interests that the 
WRK Act dignifies and affirms. This valuation of means and measures helps to 
socially construct meaning for and knowledge about what the reality of abortion 
and reproductive freedom shall be for a woman, according to the State. As such, 
the valuation of this lived reality makes present the legislature’s rendition of the 
administration of justice. 
As the findings indicate and as Table 5 reports, the Act embodies an ethics-
of-justice whose epistemology makes evident that a woman exists in her absence. 
With respect to the statute’s relevant terms, definitions, and conditions, this 
absence is made discernible in how the Act defers language that would 
otherwise value a woman’s lived experience of being a citizen, patient, child-
bearer, and mother. With respect to the statute’s requirements of informed and 
voluntary consent, a woman’s absence is made discernible in how the Act omits 
language that would otherwise make evident the risks of child forfeiture and the 
costs and benefits of a woman’s choice to remain childless. With respect to the 
statute’s requirements of printed information, a woman’s absence is made 
discernible in how the Act excludes information on or about the actual health 
and citizenship realities of mothering and the actual health and citizenship 
realities of personhood. With respect to the statute’s ultrasound requirement, a 
woman’s absence is made discernible in how the Act screens from view the “real 
time” lived experience of mothering and child care-giving, especially when 
noting the societal presence of race, gender, class effects and related opportunity-
limiting socio-cultural dynamics. Mindful of these findings, we assert that the 
North Carolina WRK Act ideologically constructs abortion, reproductive 
freedom, and a woman’s relational rights-claiming that pertains to both of them. 
As such, prospects for cultivating a more fully objective science on these 
collective matters are hierarchically silenced. The necessary legislative work that 
could make possible more inclusive statutory language is discursively 
 
110.   Stratification effects refer to the socioeconomic inequities and gendered inequalities that 
follow from classifying categories of people (e.g., woman, persons of color) into hierarchically 
constructed arrangements of privilege and power. Examples of these effects include access to medical 
treatments or technologies, quality of health services, affordability in public health care.   
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postponed. The administration of a more complete (gendered) justice remains 
performatively (un)known. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We argued that the North Carolina WRK Act reflects congressional failure 
to establish fair and proportionate legislation for a woman. Indeed, as discussed 
in this article, the Act both socially constructs and ideologically manufactures a 
non-objective statutory reality on abortion, reproductive freedom, and a 
woman’s right to knowledge about them both. Accordingly, we assert that this 
state of affairs is as unsustainable as it is untenable precisely because of the 
ethical footing that it lacks. To be sure, change is in order. 
Our proposed analytics and empirics integrated key insights from feminist 
standpoint epistemology (FSE) with Derrida’s deconstructive methodology 
(DDM) to reveal and relay a hidden text operating through the North Carolina 
WRK Act. This text makes clear that on the issue of abortion and reproductive 
choice, a woman’s existence (that is, what it means to be or to exist as a woman in 
contemporary society) depends on making absent her lived experiences.111 In 
order to initiate legislative change and to redirect the academic and practitioner 
communities to necessary reformist solutions, we recommend that additional 
analysis on the issue of abortion, reproductive freedom, and a woman’s rights-
claiming be pursued. PJ’s underlying philosophy and its corresponding ethics-of-
justice framework represent one critical approach that promotes this objective 
and that furthers progressive and inclusive evidence-based law and policy 
analysis. 
 
 
111.  That said, it is worth noting the core analytical and empirical limitations of the preceding 
inquiry. First, although innovative, the experimental nature of our investigation warrants further 
refinement. The complexities of FSE and DDM are considerable, and our commentary on them 
individually and then synthetically was deliberately structured to omit several concepts (e.g., 
Derrida’s arguments that undo themselves). Attention to these additional concepts could represent a 
basis for amplifying or restricting our preliminary findings. Second, the data collection focused only 
on adult women, and the substantive components of the Act pertaining to the exercise of their 
reproductive freedom. Missing from the data were intra-textual themes that could account for the 
procedural aspects of the legislation. Moreover, we excluded from consideration statutory language 
that could explain the political and cultural realities of abortion for a minor. Third, our interest in the 
ideological nature of abortion politics and decision-making relied on one State statute as a basis to 
explore this controversial thesis. Clearly, the generalizability of our findings is limited; thus, our 
results must be read with caution.   
 
